The Battle of Spionkop was fought on the 23rd and 24th of January 1900, the Battle of Spioenkop was the scene of the most futile and certainly the bloodiest of the four battles fought to relieve the besieged town of Ladysmith from the surrounding Boer forces.
Having suffered the fiasco of the Battle of Colenso
on the 15th of December 1899, where the British lost many men and 10
artillery pieces that were captured by the Boers in what was to become
known in Britain as the Black Week, General Sir Redvers Buller's reputation was in tatters. Although remaining as commander in Natal, he was to be superceded as commander-in-chief by Field Marshall Lord Roberts who was to be accompanied by Lord Kitchener as his chief of staff.
Having
been inactive for three weeks after Colenso, but now reinforced to a
total strength of about 30,000 men by the arrival of Sir Charles Warren's 5th Division comprising the 10th and 11 Brigades, Buller decided to try to reach Ladysmith by way of Potgieter's Drift to the west. Leaving Barton's brigade facing Colenso, he set off on the 10th of January with Dundonald's Mounted Brigade,
five infantry brigades, eight artillery batteries, ten naval guns and
650 transport wagons. From the heights above the north bank of the
uThukela River the Boer forces watched the slow progress of the 27
kilometre-long column.
The alerted Boers prepared to oppose the British advance from Brakfontein Ridge. Buller planned to throw two- thirds of his force across the river, consisting of an attack on Brakfontein
by Lyttelton with two brigades, two artillery batteries and the naval
guns, with a separate flanking force under General Warren sent to turn
the Boer's lightly- guarded western flank, consisting of General Clery's 2nd Division together with Woodgate's
11th Lancastrian Brigade, Dundonald’s force and eight artillery
batteries. The planned operation would have greatly outnumbered the
7,000 Boer defenders, but would require speed of execution to be
successful.
What ensued was a litany
of delays, lost opportunities and mistakes. Although he had misgivings
about Warren's capabilities, Buller rather concentrated his attention on
Lyttelton's energetic attack. Warren's attack was a day late in
starting and painfully slow in execution. At the same time Dundonald –
acting mainly on his own initiative – displayed great initiative and
tactical expertise but was then recalled by Warren to guard his baggage
wagons! Warren delegated an attack that he had planned against Tabanyama
to the command of General Clery, who displayed a similar lack of
tactical expertise or vigour. For two days Hart's Irishmen fought their
way to the crest only to discover that it was not in fact the actual
crest, and was overlooked by well dug-in Boers. Only on the left did
Dundonald – again – show any dash in sending forward the South African
Light Horse to seize the important Bastion Hill, but despite this
position being able to subject the Boer trenches to crossfire, Clery
cancelled the whole operation!
In the week
since he had issued orders to General Warren, Buller had witnessed the
ponderous and ineffective movements of his forces. He did not, however,
at any point, attempt to take control of matters himself. In
exasperation on the evening of the 22nd of January he told Warren either
to withdraw completely, or to take Spioenkop, which dominated
the Fairview Road which was to be the route of the planned advance to
Ladysmith. From this point the thoughts of all commanders turned towards
the seizing of this objective, 450 metres above the Tugela River. The
problem was that there was no information available whatsoever regarding
the peak, its layout or the Boer dispositions thereupon.
Warren gave command of the operation to Coke, with the actual assault to be commanded by Woodgate with the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, six companies of the 2nd King's Own Royal Lancaster and two from the 1st South Lancashire, together with 200 dismounted men from Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry – a total of about 1,700 men.
At 11pm on the 23rd the ascent began in drizzle and mist, what appeared
to be the crest being attained in thick mist at around 4am . A
275-metre long trench was dug in the stony soil, with a small rock
parapet of boulders. At first light, however, it was seen that the
trench was in fact situated on a small plateau, with the true summit
some 50 to 140 metres away with dead ground in between. The British then
proceeded to entrench on the crest. Little did they know that this was
to be their 'death trap'. This position was clearly visible from alerted
Boer riflemen who had taken on positions on 3 hills known as Aloe Knoll, Green Hill and Conical Hill,
a Krupp field gun unit on Twin Peaks, a pom-pom unit on a ridge between
Twin Peaks and Aloe Knoll and Boers who were advancing up the
north-east slope of Spionkop. Artillery, consisting of four guns on Ntabamnyama and one at General Botha's HQ had also been positioned to fire directly on this position.
As the mist cleared away, the Boers fired heavily on the British exacting a heavy toll, which included the death of Major General Woodgate. These losses were compounded by the fact that a signaller with the name Louis Bothma, was able to use a heliograph to direct the fire of the Boer artillery.
The Lanchashire Fusiliers on the extreme right (North East) bore the
brunt of the Boer 'fire' - particularly from Aloe Knoll and Twin Peaks.
Many of these soldiers surrendered or were forced to retreat and as a
result the Boers began to take control of the north western, northern
and north-eastern crest line.
Thorneycroft, - managed to
take control of the situation by shouting out to the Boers, 'I am the
commandant here, take your men to Hell sir! There's no surrender.' These
words together with reinforcements - the Imperial Light Infantry and Middlesex Regiments
- inspired the British forces to retain their positions. The Middlesex
Regiments were then ordered to fix bayonets and charge the Boers - this
effort forced the Boers to retreat back beyond the crest.
Major General Lyttleton at Potgieters Drift had also ordered the Scottish Rifles and Bethune Mounted Infantry to climb the steep southern slope of Spionkop to render assistance. The Kings Royal Rifles were also despatched to seize Twin Peaks.
Just after five o'clock the King's Royal Rifles, supported by naval gun
fire from Mount Alice, managed to gain possession of the Twin Peaks ,
forcing the Boers to remove their Krupp and pom-pom guns from the area.
The British were now poised to drive the Boers off Aloe Knoll and from
there they could have made the conditions for those holding the
north-east line extremely difficult. However, at this crucial moment,
Buller for some obscure reason, ordered the King's Royal Rifles to
withdraw.
As dusk set in, Thornycraft was overcome by a feeling
that he had been deserted by Buller and Warren. As he looked about him
he saw a battlefield and trench littered with wounded, dying and dead
men. They were all exhausted, thirsty and hungry. Even the Scottish
Rifles, Imperial Light Infantry and Middlesex Regiment were badly in
need of rest.
He thus, after conferring with other senior officers, decided to order a retreat at 20h00.
General
Warren had himself spent most of the day displaying no sense of
urgency, busying himself with minor administrative matters. Not until
8pm, when he received a gloomy report of circumstances on the hill,
together with a graphic eyewitness report from Winston Churchill,
did he stir himself. By this stage it was already too late as
Thorneycroft, who had been in command of the situation on the summit all
day, had announced that he was withdrawing his remaining men to avoid
further slaughter. Informed of this at 2am Warren could still have
rescued the situation by sending fresh troops to the summit, but neither
he or Buller had the will to continue. The irony was that the Boers,
who had also suffered substantial casualties throughout the day, had
also withdrawn during the night, but upon discovering the British
withdrawal the following morning they re-occupied the summit.
The dreadful day of bloodshed cost the British some 1,200 casualties, of
whom over 300 were killed. In total Boer casualties amounted to some
300 men, 62 percent of whom were from the Carolina Commando.
On day two you will be transported by road to the sites of the Battle of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift (22nd January 1879) accompanied by your historian who will relate the the happenings on that dreadful day